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PARADOXES OF FAIR DIVISION*
P

aradoxes, if they do not define a field, render its problems

intriguing and often perplexing, especially insofar as the paradoxes remain unresolved. Voting theory, for example, has
been greatly stimulated by the Condorcet paradox, which is the
discovery by the Marquis de Condorcet' that there may be no alternative that is preferred by a majority to every other alternative,
producing so-called cyclical majorities. Its modern extension and
generalization is Arrow's2theorem, which says, roughly speaking, that
a certain set of reasonable conditions for aggregating individuals'
preferences into some social choice are inconsistent.
In the last fifty years, hundreds of books and thousands of articles
have been written about these and related social-choice paradoxes
and theorems, as well as their ramifications for voting and democracy.
Hannu Nurmi3 provides a good survey and classification of voting
paradoxes and also offers advice on "how to deal with them."
There is also an enormous literature on fairness, justice, and
equality, and numerous suggestions on how to rectify the absence of
these properties or attenuate their erosion. But paradoxes do not
frame the study of fairness in the same way they have inspired
social-choice theory.
To be sure, the notion thatjustice and order may be incompatible,
or that maximin justice in John Rawls's4sense undercuts the motivation of individuals to strive to do their best, underscores the possible
trade-offs in making societies more just or egalitarian. For example,
an egalitarian society may require strictures on free choice to ward off
anarchy; rewarding the worst-off members of a society may deaden
competition among the most able if their added value is siphoned off
to others.
Obstacles like these which stand in the way of creating ajust society
are hardly surprising. They are not paradoxes in the strong sense of
* Brams acknowledges the support of the C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics at New York University. Research by Edelman was done while he was in the
School of Mathematics, University of Minnesota. We thank Dorothea Herreiner for
valuable comments.
1 Essai sur l'alpplicationde l'analyse dila probabilitedes decisionsrenduesa la pluralitWdes
voix (Paris: De L'Imprimerie royale,1785).
2 KennethJ. Arrow, Social Choiceand Individual Values (New Haven: Yale, 1951; 21d
ed., 1963).
3 VotingParadoxes and How to Deal with Them (Berlin: Springer, 1999).
4 A TheoryofJustice (Cambridge: Harvard, 1971).
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constituting a logical contradiction between equally valid principles.
Here we use paradox in a weaker sense-as a conflict among fairness
conditions that one might expect to be compatible. Because we are
surprised to discover this conflict, it is "nonobvious," as one of us
labeled a collection of paradoxes he assembled about politics.5
The fair-division paradoxes we present here all concern how to
divide up a set of indivisible items among two or more players. In
some paradoxes, we assume the players can do no more than rank the
items from best to worst; in others, we assume they can, in addition,
indicate preferences over subsets, or packages, of items. While our
framework is generally an ordinalist one, we do admit one cardinalization of ranks, based on the Borda count used in voting, to facilitate
certain comparisons, particularly those involving allocations with different numbers of items.
The main criteria we invoke are efficiency (there is no other division
better for everybody, or better for some players and not worse for the
others) and envy-freeness (each player likes her allocation at least as
much as those which the other players receive, so she does not envy
anybody else). But because efficiency, by itself, is not a criterion of
fairness (an efficient allocation could be one in which one player gets
everything and the others nothing), we also consider other criteria of
fairness besides envy-freeness, including two different measures of
how a worst-off player fares (maximin and Borda maximin), which we
contrast with a utilitarian notion of overall welfare (Borda total
score). What we rule out, besides the splitting of items, is the possibility of randomizing among different allocations, which is another
way that has been proposed for "smoothing out" inequalities caused
by the indivisibility of items.6

5 Brams, Paradoxes in Politics: An Introduction to the Nonobvious in Political Science
(New York: Free Press, 1976); see also Fishburn, "Paradoxes of Voting," American
Political Science ReviezV,LXVIII, 2 (June 1974): 537-46, and Fishburn and Brams,
"Paradoxes of Preferential Voting," MathematicsMagazine, LVI, 4 (September 1983):
207-1 4.
6
Fair-division procedures that allow for the splitting of (divisible) goods or the
based on a randomization process that
sharing of (indivisible) goods-possibly
determines time shares-are discussed in, among other places, John Broome,
Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991); H.
Peyton Young, Equity in Theory and Practice (Princeton: University Press, 1994);
Introduction (Princeton: UniHerv6 Moulin, CooperativeEconomics:A Game-Theoretic
versity Press, 1995); Brams and Alan D. Taylor, Fair Division: From Cake-Cuttingto
Dispute Resolution (New York: Cambridge, 1996);Jack Robertson and William Webb,
Cake-CuttingAlgorithms:Be Fair If You Can (Natick, MA: A. K. Peters, 1998); and
Brams and Taylor, The Win-WinSolution: GuaranteeingFair Shares to Eveiybody(New
York: Norton, 1999).
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Our paradoxes demonstrate the opportunities as well as the limitations of fair division. Thus, for example, while the only division of
items in which one player never envies the allocation of another may
be nonexistent or inefficient, we note that there is alwaysan efficient
and envy-free division for two players-even when they rank all items
the same-as long as they do not rank all subsets of items the same.
We also show that fair division may entail an unequal division of the
items.

We divide the paradoxes into three categories:
(1) The conflict between efficiency and envy-freeness(paradoxes 1
and 2).
(2) The failure of a unique efficient and envy-freedivision to satisfy
other criteria(paradoxes3 and 4).
(3) The desirability,on occasion, of dividing items unequally (paradoxes 5, 6, 7, 8).
While the paradoxes highlight difficulties in creating "fair shares"
for everybody, they by no means render the task impossible. Rather,
they show how dependent fair division is on the fairness criteria one
deems important and the trade-offs one considers acceptable. Put
another way, achieving fairness requires some consensus on the
ground rules (that is, criteria) and some delicacy in applying them
(to facilitate trade-offs when the criteria conflict).
We mention three technical points before we proceed to specific
examples. First, we assume that players cannot compensate each
other with side payments-the division is only of the indivisible items.
Second, all players have positive values for every item. Third, a player
prefersone set S of items to a different set T if (i) S has as many items
as Tand (ii) for every item t in Tand not in S, there is a distinct item
s in S and not T that the player prefers to t. For example, if a player
ranks items 1 through 4 in order of decreasing preference 1234, we
assume that she prefers
* the set {1,2}to {2,3},because {1}is preferredto {3},and
* the set {1,3}to {2,4},because {1}is preferredto {21and {3}is preferred
to {4}
whereas the comparison between sets 11,41and {2,3} could go either
way.
I. EFFICIENCY AND ENVY-FREENESS: THEY MAY BE INCOMPATIBLE

Paradox 1: a unique envy-freedivision may be inefficient.Suppose there is
a set of three players, {A, B, Ct, that must divide a set of six indivisible
items, 11, 2, 3, 4, 5, 61.Assume the players strictly rank the items from
best to worst as follows:
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ExampleI:
A: 1 2 3 4 5 6
B: 4 3 2 1 5 6
C: 5 1 2 6 3 4

The uniqueenvy-free allocation to (A, B, C) is ({1,3}, {2,4}, {5,6}), or for
simplicity (13, 24, 56), whereby A and B get their best and third-best
items, and C gets her best and fourth-best items. Clearly, A prefers her
allocation to that of B (which are A's second-best and fourth-best
items) and that of C (which are A's two worst items). Likewise, B and
C prefer their allocations to those of the other two players. Consequently, the division (13, 24, 56) is envy-free: all players prefer their
allocations to those of the other two players, so no player is envious
of any other.
Compare this division with (12, 34, 56), whereby A and B receive
their two best items, and C receives, as before, her best and fourthbest items. This division Pareto-dominates
(13, 24, 56), because two of
the three players (A and B) prefer the former allocation, whereas
both allocations give player C the same two items (56).
It is easy to see that (12, 34, 56) is Pareto-optimal, or efficient: no
player can do better with some other division without some other
player or players doing worse. This is apparent from the fact that the
only way A or B, who get their two best items, can do better is to
receive an additional item from one of the two other playersassuming all items have some positive value for the players-but this
will necessarily hurt the player who then receives fewer than her
present two items. Whereas C can do better without receiving a third
item if she receives item 1 or 2 in place of item 6, this substitution
would necessarily hurt A, which will do worse if she receives item 6 for
item 1 or 2.
The problem with efficient allocation (12, 34, 56) is that it is not
assuredlyenvy-free. In particular, C will envy A's allocation of 12
(second-best and third-best items for C) if she prefers these two items
to her present allocation of 56 (best and fourth-best items for C). In
the absence of information about C's preferences for subsets of items,
therefore, we cannot say that efficient allocation (12, 34, 56) is
envy-free.7

7 Henceforth we shall mean by 'envy-free'a divisionsuch that, no

matterhow the

players value subsets of items consistent with their rankings, no player prefers any
other player's allocation to her own. If a division is not envy-free, we call it
envy-possibleif a player's allocation may make her envious of another player, depending on how she values subsets of items, as illustrated by division (12, 34, 56) in the
text. It is envy-ensuringif it causes envy, independent of how the players value subsets
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But the real bite of paradox 1 stems from the fact that not only is
inefficient division (13, 24, 56) envy-free, but it is uniquely so-there
is no other division, including an efficient one, that guarantees
envy-freeness. To show this in example I, note first that an envy-free
division must give each player her best item; if not, then a player
might prefer a division, like envy-free division (13, 24, 56) or efficient
division (12, 34, 56), that does give each player her best item, rendering the division that does not envy-possible or envy-ensuring.
Second, even if each player receives her best item, this allocation
cannot be the only item she receives, because then the player might
envy any player that receives two or more items, whateverthese
items are.
By this reasoning, then, the only possible envy-free divisions in
example I are those in which each player receives two items, including her top choice. It is easy to check that no efficient division is
envy-free.8 Similarly, one can check that no inefficient division, except (13, 24, 56) that gives each player two items-including her
best-is envy-free, making this division uniquely envy-free.
Paradox 2: there may be no envy-free division, even when all players have
different preference rankings. While it is bad enough when the only

envy-free division is inefficient (paradox 1), it seems even worse when
there is no envy-free division. This is trivial to show when players rank
items the same. For example, if two players both prefer item I to item
2, then the player that gets item 2 will envy the player that gets
item 1.
In the following example, each of three players has a different
ranking of three items:
ExampleII:
A: 1 2 3
B: 1 3 2
C: 2 1 3
There are three divisions, in which each player gets exactly one item,
which are efficient-(1, 3, 2), (2, 1, 3), and (3, 1, 2)-in each of
which at least one player gets her best item. It is evident that none is

of items. In effect, a division that is envy-possiblehas the potential to cause envy.By
comparison,an envy-ensuringdivisionalwayscauses envy,and an envy-freedivision
never causes envy.
8 We previously showed that division (12, 34, 56) is not envy-free. As another
example, consider efficient division (16, 34, 25). Whereas neither B nor C envies
each other or A, A might prefer either B's 34 or C's 25 allocations, making this
division envy-possible.
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envy-free, because the player that gets item 1 in each (A or B) will be
envied by at least one of the other two players. For instance, in the
case of the division (2, 1, 3), both A and C will envy B.
Can an inefficient division be envy-free, as was the case in example
I? It is not hard to see that this situation cannot occur in example II
for the reason given above: the player that gets item 1 will be envied.
But in the case of an inefficient division, "trading up to efficiency"
reduces the amount of envy. For example, consider inefficient division
(2, 3, 1), in which each player receives her second-best choice.
Because A envies C, B envies C, and C envies A, a trade of items 1 and
2 between A and C is possible. It yields efficient division (1, 3, 2), in
which only B envies A.
Besides (2, 3, 1), the other two inefficient divisions-(1, 2, 3) and
(3, 2, 1)-also allow for trading up to efficiency. In the first, a trade
of items 2 and 3 between B and Cyields efficient division (1, 3, 2); in
the second, a trade of items 1 and 2 between B and C yields efficient
division (3, 1, 2). Three-way trades are also possible. For instance,
starting from inefficient division (3, 2, 1), a three-way trade, whereby
A sends item 3 to B, B sends item 2 to C, and C sends item 1 to A,
yields efficient division (1, 3, 2).
Trading up to efficiency is also possible in example I: by exchanging items 2 and 3, A and B can turn inefficient division (13, 24, 56)
into efficient division (12, 34, 56). As in example II, however, no
efficient division is envy-free in example I. The difference between
examples I and II is that example II does not admit even an inefficient envy-free division.
II. UNIQUE EFFICIENT AND ENVY-FREE DIVISIONS: THEIR
INCOMPATIBILITY WITH OTHER CRITIERIA

Paradox 3: a unique efficient and envy-freedivision may lose in voting to an
efficient and envy-possible division. So far we have shown that efficiency

and envy-freeness may part company either by there being no envyfree division that is also efficient (example I), or no envy-free division
at all (example II). But when these properties coincide, and there is
both an efficient and an envy-free division, it may not be the choice
of a majority of players, as illustrated by the following example:
ExampleIII:
A: 1 2 3 4 5 6
B: 5 6 2 1 4 3
C: 3 6 5 4 1 2
There are three efficient divisions in which (A, B, C) each get two
items: (12, 56, 34); (12, 45, 36); and (14, 25, 36). But only the third
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division, (14, 25, 36), is envy-free. Whereas C might prefer B's 56
allocation in the first division, and B might prefer A's 12 allocation in
the second division, no player prefers another player's allocation in
(14, 25, 36).
But observe that both A and B prefer the first division, (12, 56, 34),
to the envy-free third division, (14, 25, 36), because they get their top
two items in the first division; only C gets her top two items in (14, 25,
36). Hence, the first division would defeat the envy-free third division,
(14, 25, 36), by simple majority rule.
The situation is not so clear-cut when we compare the second
division, (12, 45, 36), with the envy-free (14, 25, 36). In fact, there
would be a tie vote: C would be indifferent, because she gets her top
two items, 36, in each division; A would prefer the second division
(top two items versus best and fourth-best items); and B would prefer
the envy-free division, (14, 25, 36) (best and third-best items versus
best and fifth-best items).
Thus, if there were a vote, the unique envy-free division, (14, 25,
36), would lose to the envy-possible division, (12, 56, 34), and it would
tie with the other envy-possible division, (12, 45, 36). If there were
"approval voting,"9 and A, B, and C voted only for the divisions that
give each player her two best items, then the envy-free division, (14,
25, 36), would get 1 vote, compared to 2 votes each for both of the
envy-possible divisions, (12, 56, 34) and (12, 45, 36). In sum, players
will choose an envy-possible over the unique envy-free division, (14,
25, 36), in either pairwise comparisons or approval voting.
Paradox 4: neither the Rawlsian maximin criterion nor the Borda totalscore criterion may choose a unique efficient and envy-free division. Besides

using voting to select an efficient division, consider the following
Rawlsian maximin criterion to distinguish among efficient divisions:
choose the division that maximizes the minimum rank of items that
players receive, making a worst-off player as well off as possible. To
illustrate in example III, envy-possible division (12, 45, 36) gives a
fifth-best item to B, whereas each of the two other efficient divisions
gives a player, at worst, a fourth-best item. Between the latter two
divisions, the envy-possible division, (12, 56, 34) is, arguably, better
than the envy-free division, (14, 25, 36), because it gives the other two
players-those which do not get a fourth-best item-their two best

9 Under approval voting, voters can vote for as many alternatives as they like; each
alternative approved of receives one vote, and the alternative with the most votes
wins. See Brains and Fishburn, Approval Voting (Boston: Birkhduser, 1983).
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items, whereas envy-free division (14, 25, 36) does not give B her two
best items.10
A modified Borda count would also give the nod to the envypossible division, (12, 56, 34), compared not only with the envy-free
division, (14, 25, 36), but also with the other envy-possible division,
(12, 45, 36). Awarding 6 points for obtaining a best item, 5 points for
obtaining a second-best item,..., 1 point for obtaining a worst item in
example III, the latter two divisions give the players a total of 30
points, whereas envy-possible division (12, 56, 34) gives the players a
total of 31 points,1" which we call their Borda total scoresand use as a
measure of the overall utility or welfare of the players. Hence an
envy-possible division beats the unique envy-free division, based on
both the maximin criterion and the Borda total-score criterion. (We
shall later apply the Borda count to individual players, asking what
division maximizes the minimum Borda score that any player receives.)
III. THE DESIRABILITY OF UNEQUAL

DIVISIONS

(SOMETIMES)

Paradox5: an unequal division of itemsmay bepreferredby all playersto an
equal division. In section II, we showed that neither (i) pairwise
comparison voting or approval voting (paradox 3), nor (ii) the
maximin criterion or the Borda total-score criterion (paradox 4),
always selects a unique efficient and envy-free division. In the following example, there is also a unique efficient and envy-free division-in which all players receive the same number of items
(henceforth called an equal division)-but there may be grounds for
choosing an efficient but unequal envy-possible division:
ExampleIV:
A: 1 2 3 4
B: 2 3 4 1

10This might be considered a second-orderapplicationof the maximin criterion:
if, for two divisions, players rank the worst item any player receives the same,
consider the playerthat receivesa next-worstitem in each, and choose the division
decisionrule,
in which this item is rankedhigher. This is an example of a lexicographic
wherebyalternativesare ordered on the basis of a most importantcriterion;if that
is not determinative,a next-most important criterion is invoked, and so on, to
narrowdown the set of feasible alternatives.
11The standardscoring rules for the Borda count in this 6-item example would
give 5 points to a best item, 4 points to a second-best item,..., 0 points to a worst
item. We depart slightlyfrom this standardscoring rule to ensure that each player
obtains some positive value for all items, including her worst choice, as assumed
earlier.
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It is not difficult to show that (13, 24) is the only efficient and
envy-free division. Two other equal divisions, (12, 34) and (14, 23),
while better for one player and worse for the other, are envy-possible.
The above three equal divisions all give Borda total scores of 12 to
their players. If we eliminate the envy-possible division, (14, 23), on
the grounds that it fails the maximin criterion by giving A her worst
item (item 4), then the comparison reduces to that between envy-free
division, (13, 24), and envy-possible division, (12, 34).
Curiously, it is possible that both A and B prefer the unequal
envy-possible division, (134, 2), to the equal envy-possible division,
(12, 34).12 Thus, unequal divisions might actually be better for all
players than equal divisions.
Ruling out equal division (12, 34) in such a situation, let us
compare (134, 2) with the envy-free (equal) division (13, 24). Clearly,
(134, 2) is better than (13, 24) for A, but it is worse for B.
This leaves open the question of which of these two divisions,
involving an equal and an unequal division of the items, comes closer
to giving the two players "fairshares." As the next paradox shows, an
unequal division may actually be more egalitarian-as measured by
Borda scores for individual players-than an equal division.
Paradox 6: an unequal division of itemsmay (i) maximizethe minimum
Bordascoresof players(Bordamaximin)and (ii) maximizethe sum of Borda
scores(Bordamaxsum).In paradox 5, we showed that an unequal but
envy-possible division of items may compare favorably with an equal
and envy-free division. To make this kind of comparison more precise, consider the following example:
ExampleV:
A: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
B: 3 1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9
C: 4 1 2 3 6 5 7 8 9
There are exactly two unequal divisions, (12, 357, 4689) and (12,
3589, 467), that maximize the minimum Borda scores of players,
which are [17, 17, 17] for both divisions.13 On the other hand, there
are two equal divisions, (129, 357, 468) and (129, 358, 467), that
maximize the minimum Borda scores of players, which are [18, 17,
16] for the first division and [18, 16, 17] for the second division.
These are all the divisions whose Borda total scores are 51, which, it

This is true if A prefers 34 to 2, and B prefers 2 to 34.
we shall indicate the Borda scores of players [in brackets] to
distinguish them from item allocations (in parentheses).
12

3Henceforth
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can be shown, is the maximal sum, or Borda maxsum, among all
possible divisions (equal or unequal).
Notice that the worst-off player in the two unequal divisions garners
17 points (so does the best-off player, because the Borda scores of all
players are the same), whereas the worst-off player in the two equal
divisions receives fewer points (16). By the maximin criterion, but
now based on Borda scores, the unequal divisions are more egalitarian. We call this the Bordamaximincriterion, which is especially useful
in comparing equal and unequal divisions.'4
None of the four equal or unequal divisions is envy-free-all are
envy-possible or envy-ensuring. Likewise, all four divisions are "efficient-possible" in the sense that there may be a more efficient division, but this is not guaranteed. Take, for example, the unequal
division (12, 357, 4689). B or C might prefer A's 12 allocation, just as
A might prefer B's or C's allocation, so a trade could make two, or
even all three, players better off. Unlike our previous examples, in
which divisions called "efficient"were all "efficient-ensuring" (that is,
there were no trades that could improve the lot of all traders, however
players valued subsets of items), this is not the case in example V.
The Borda maximin criterion seems a reasonable one to distinguish among all efficient-possible and envy-possible divisions. In example V, it is not only unequal divisions that do best on this criterion,
but these divisions are also Borda maxsum, making them both fair
and utility-maximizing (according to the Borda cardinalization of
utility-more on its limitations, illustrated in example VII, later).
Paradox 7: an unequal division of items may be Borda maxsumbut not
Borda maximin. There was no conflict between Borda maxsum and
Borda maximin in example V-two unequal divisions satisfied both
these properties. But as the next example illustrates, this need not be
the case:
ExampleVI:
A: 1 2 3
B: 1 3 2

14
To see why, consider the two unequal divisions in example IV in which no
player receives a fourth-best item: (1, 234) and (123, 4). To call these divisions
maximin-like equal division (13, 24), in which no player receives a fourth-best
item as well-seems highly questionable, because the player receiving her top three
items in these two divisions can hardly be considered worse off (because she
receives a third-best item) than the player receiving only her top item. Indeed, the
Borda scores of the players in the two unequal divisions, [4, 9] and [9, 2], reveal
how inegalitarian these divisions are, particularly when compared with equal Borda
maximin division (13, 24) with Borda scores of [6, 6].
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There are two unequal maxsum divisions, (12, 3) and (2, 13),
whose Borda scores are, respectively, [5, 2] and [2, 5]. Each gives a
Borda total score of 7, and a minimum Borda score of 2 for a player.
By contrast, there are two Borda maximin divisions, (1, 23) and
(23, 1), both of which give Borda scores of [3, 3]. While they give the
players a lower Borda total score (6) than the Borda maxsum divisions, they give the players a higher minimum score of 3.
Presumably, the egalitarian would choose one of the two Borda
maximin divisions, whereas the utilitarian would choose one of the
two Borda maxsum divisions. Because there are an odd number of
items to divide in example VI, all the divisions between A and B are
necessarily unequal. But both Borda maximin divisions and Borda
maxsum divisions can be the either equal (unlike example VI, the
Borda maximin division in example IV is equal, as discussed in
footnote 14) or unequal (two of the Borda maxsum divisions in
example V are equal and two are unequal). It also turns out that
Borda maxsum and Borda maximin scores can be arbitrarily far

apart.15
We believe that when Borda maximin and Borda total scores
choose different divisions, Borda maximin generally gives the fairer
division by guaranteeing that the Borda score of the worst-off player
is as great as possible.16 As we shall show in our final paradox,
however, a Borda maximin division may be quite implausible, depending on how players value subsets; or it may not be envy-free
when, at the same time, there exists an envy-free division that is
neither maximin nor Borda maximin.
Paradox 8: if thereare envy-freedivisions, none maybe maximin or Borda
maximin. In the following example, there are two players but an odd
number of items, so no equal division of the items is possible:
ExampleVII:
A: 1 2345
B: 1 2345
15
Brams, Edelman, and Fishburn, "Fair Division of Indivisible Items" (unpublished).
1'6To be sure, assuming that the differences in ranks are all equal, as Borda
scoring does, is a simplification. If cardinal utilities could be elicited that reflect the
players' intensities of preference, then these utilities-instead of the rank scorescould be used to equalize, insofar as possible, players' satisfaction with a division of
the items. For fair-division bidding schemes that incorporate cardinal information,
see Brams and Taylor, Fair Division and The Win-WinSolution; Brams and D. Marc
Kilgour, "Competitive Fair Division," Journal of Political Economy,cix, 2 (April 2001):
418-43; and Claus-Jochen Haake, Matthias G. Raith, and Francis E. Su, "Bidding for
Envy-Freeness: A Procedural Approach to n-Player Fair-Division Problems," Social
Choiceand Welfare(forthcoming).
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Because the players rank the items exactly the same, all divisions are
efficient, making the choice of a fairest one appear difficult.
Only six divisions, however, are what Brams and Fishburn'7 call
undoominatedsplits:

(1, 2345); (12, 345); (13, 245); (14, 235); (I5, 234); (145, 23)
These divisions are those in which, in the absence of information
about preferences over subsets, either of the two allocations in each
might be preferred by a player, making each undominated. All these
divisions, therefore, are envy-possible.
The Borda maximin divisions are (13, 245) and (14, 235), which
give Borda scores of, respectively, [8, 7] and [7, 8] to the players. But
neither division might be envy-free if, say, bothplayers prefer allocation 13 to 245 in the first and allocation 14 to 235 in the second-that
is, both prefer the "same side" of each division. These preferences
imply that both prefer allocation 12 to 345 in the second division,
(12, 345), and allocation 145 to 23 in the sixth division, (145, 23),
precluding these divisions, as well, from being envy-free.
Thus, the preferences of A and B assumed above would eliminate
four of the undominated splits from being envy-free, allowing the two
remaining divisions to be so. For example, A might prefer allocation
1 in the first division and allocation 15 in the fifth, whereas B might
prefer the complements: allocation 2345 in the first, and allocation
234 in the fifth.
In none of our previous examples with envy-free divisions was such
a division not Borda maximin. But as we have just illustrated, there
may be several envy-free divisions, none of which is Borda maximin.
This divergence points to the limitation of Borda maximin as a
criterion for choosing divisions, because Borda scoring may not
reflect the intensity of player preferences that can be better gleaned
from player preferences over subsets.
But we do not need to know player preferences over subsets to
show that an envy-free division may not be Borda maximin:
ExampleVIII:
A: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
B: 5 8 1 2 6 7 3 4 9
C: 3 4 9 1 2 5 6 7 8

'7 "Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People with Identical Preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and Equity," Social Choiceandl Welfare,XVII,
2 (February 2000): 247-67.
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It is easy to see that division (127, 568, 349) is envy-free, but it gives
a seventh-best item to A. By contrast, division (126, 587, 349) gives
sixth-best items to A and B and the same 349 allocation to C.
Because no other divisions (equal or unequal) give players lowestranked items that are as high as sixth-best, division (126, 578, 349) is
maximin. But it is not envy-free: B may envy A, because she may prefer
allocation 126 to 578, making this division envy-possible.
The Borda scores of the envy-free division are [20, 22, 24], whereas
those of the maximin division are [21, 21, 24], so the maximin
division is also Borda maximin. Both the envy-free and maximin/
Borda maximin divisions have total Borda scores of 66, which is also
the Borda maxsum in example VIII.
This example illustrates what we think is our most striking paradox.
Specificially, without any special assumptions about the preferences
of the players for subsets of items, it shows the clash between envyfreeness and both maximin and Borda maximin. Furthermore, because there are no unequal divisions in example VIII that satisfy any
of our fairness criteria- or, for that matter, the Borda maxsum
criterion-it highlights the difficulty of choosing a fairest allocation,
even in the equal-division case: Should one help the worst-off, or
avoid envy, when one cannot do both?'8

18
This question is more fully explored in Brains and Daniel King, "Efficient Fair
Division: Help the Worst Off or Avoid Envy?" (unpublished), in which it is shown
not only that maximin and Borda maximin divisions may not be envy-free but also
that all such divisions may actually ensure envy. To illustrate this conflict, consider
the following example:

A: 1 2 3 4 5 6
B: 1 2 3 4 5 6
C: 1 5 4 6 2 3
There are four Borda maximin divisions-(14, 23, 56), (23, 14, 56), (13, 24, 56),
(24, 13, 56), each giving a minimum Borda score of 8 to a player-which are also
maximin divisions (a worst-off player receives a fourth-best item). In addition, there
are two maximin divisions which are not Borda maximin divisions-(12, 34, 56),
(34, 12, 56)-which also give a worst-off player a fourth-best item. All six divisions
ensure envy: in each, one player prefers another player's two items to her own. This
example demonstrates that maximin and Borda maximin divisions, rather than just
preclude envy-freeness, may guarantee envy (that is, be envy-ensuring rather than
just envy-possible, as in example VIII). Furthermore, unlike example II, in which
the unique efficient maximin and Borda maximin division, (1, 3, 2), is also envyensuring, the present example involves each player's receiving two items, which one
might think would be sufficient to allow a maximin or Borda maximin division to
be envy-possible, if not envy-free. This, however, is not the case, underscoring the
seriousness of the conflict among our fairness criteria.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS

The eight paradoxes pinpoint difficulties in dividing up indivisible
items so that each player feels satisfied, in some sense, with her
allocation. The first two paradoxes show that efficient and envy-free
divisions may be incompatible because the only envy-free division
may be inefficient, or there may be no envy-free division at all.
Both of these paradoxes require at least three players.'9 When
there are only two players, even when they rank items exactly the
same, it turns out that efficient and envy-free divisions can always be
found, except when the players have the same preferences over all
subsets of items.20
But the existence of even a unique efficient and envy-free division
may not be chosen by the players for other reasons. In particular,
such a division will not necessarily be selected when players vote for
the division or divisions that they prefer. Also, a unique efficient and
envy-free division will not necessarily be the division that maximizes
the minimum rank of items that players receive, so the Rawlsian
maximin criterion of making the worst-off player as well off as possible may not single it out.
As a way of measuring the value of allocations to find those divisions which are most egalitarian, especially in comparing equal and
unequal divisions, we used Borda scoring based on player rankings of
the items. We showed that a Borda maximin division may not be a
Borda maxsum division, indicating the possible conflict between
egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes.
This difference may show up when there are as few as two players
dividing up three items, making it impossible to divide the items
equally between the players. But even when this is possible, unequal
divisions of items may be the only ones that satisfy the Borda maximin
criterion. While indicating a preference for this criterion over the
Borda maxsum criterion when the two clash, we illustrated how
Borda maximin divisions may fail badly in finding envy-free divisions.
Indeed, there may be no overlap between Borda maximin and envyfree divisions.
Our purpose is not just to indicate the pitfalls of fair division by
exhibiting paradoxes that can occur. There are also opportunities,
but these depend on the judicious application of selection criteria
when not all criteria can be satisfied simultaneously.
191Edelman and Fishburn, "Fair Division of Indivisible Items among People with
Similar Preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences,XLI, 3 (May 2001): 327-47.
20
Brams and Fishburn, "Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People
with Identical Preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity."
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Several recent papers have suggested constructive procedures for
finding the most plausible candidates for fair division of a set of
indivisible items.21 We find this direction promising, because it is
potentially applicable to ameliorating, if not solving, practical probfrom the splitting of the marital proplems of fair division-ranging
erty in a divorce to determining who gets what in an international
dispute. While some conflicts are ineradicable, as the paradoxes
demonstrate, the trade-offs that best resolve these conflicts are by no
means evident.
STEVEN J. BRAMS

New York University
PAUL H. EDELMAN

Vanderbilt University
PETER C. FISHBURN

AT&T Shannon Laboratory

21
Brams and Fishburn, "Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People
with Identical Preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity"; Edelman
and Fishburn; Brams, Edelman, and Fishburn; Brams and King; and Dorothea
Herreiner and Clemens Puppe, "A Simple Procedure for Finding Equitable Allocations of Indivisible Goods," Social Choiceand Welfare(forthcoming).
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